讲座题目🧜‍♀️：How Less Information ImprovesMatching on A P2P Platform?

讲座时间🏷✈️：2018年12月12日中午12:30

讲座地点：MBA中心A28

主讲人🏃：Ying Lei (雷莹),北京大学光华管理K8凯发市场营销系

雷莹，助理教授🫎，现任教于北京大学光华管理K8凯发营销系，于2016年获得美国波士顿大学的经济学博士学位🐾。研究领域包括应用博弈论、机制设计、产业经济学和信息经济学等。目前的研究兴趣包括公司竞争策略（广告策略2️⃣、定价策略等），平台竞争📽，消费者评价等。

Abstract: We consider atwo-sided matching scenario on a P2P platform. Each agent on one side, called"senders", sends an offer to an agent on the other side, called"receivers". A match is successful if a receiver accepts an offer.Both senders and receivers are differentiated in two dimensions, a verticalattribute like quality and a horizontal attribute like location. The utilityfrom a match increases with vertical quality and decreases with horizontaldistance for both senders and receivers. We compare equilibrium strategies andwelfare when the platform displays only horizontal, only vertical or bothhorizontal and vertical information of senders and receivers, and show thathiding vertical information always weakly improves platform profit, but havedifferent welfare effects for different types of agents.